Rename MySigningDriver* to MySigning*
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@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
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/*
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ATSHA204 signing backend. The Atmel ATSHA204 offers true random number generation and
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HMAC-SHA256 authentication with a readout-protected key.
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Created by Patrick "Anticimex" Fallberg <patrick@fallberg.net>
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*/
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#include "MySigning.h"
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#include "MySigningAtsha204.h"
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// Uncomment this to get some useful serial debug info (Serial.print and Serial.println expected)
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//#define DEBUG_ATSHA_SIGNING
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#ifdef DEBUG_ATSHA_SIGNING
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#define DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN(args) Serial.println(args)
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#else
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#define DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN(args)
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#endif
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#ifdef DEBUG_ATSHA_SIGNING
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static void DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTBUF(char* str, uint8_t* buf, uint8_t sz)
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{
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int i;
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Serial.println(str);
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for (int i=0; i<sz; i++)
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{
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if (buf[i] < 0x10)
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{
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Serial.print('0'); // Because Serial.print does not 0-pad HEX
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}
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Serial.print(buf[i], HEX);
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}
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Serial.println();
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}
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#else
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#define DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTBUF(str, buf, sz)
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#endif
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MySigningAtsha204::MySigningAtsha204(bool requestSignatures, uint8_t atshaPin)
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:
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MySigning(requestSignatures),
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atsha204(atshaPin),
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verification_ongoing(false)
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{
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// We set the part of the 32-byte nonce that does not fit into a message to 0xAA
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memset(current_nonce, 0xAA, sizeof(current_nonce));
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}
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bool MySigningAtsha204::getNonce(MyMessage &msg) {
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// Wake device before starting operations
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if (atsha204.sha204c_wakeup(rx_buffer) != SHA204_SUCCESS) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Failed to wake device");
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return false;
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}
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// Generate random number for use as nonce
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if (atsha204.sha204m_execute(SHA204_RANDOM, RANDOM_NO_SEED_UPDATE, 0, 0, NULL,
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RANDOM_COUNT, tx_buffer, RANDOM_RSP_SIZE, rx_buffer) != SHA204_SUCCESS) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Failed to generate nonce");
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return false;
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}
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// We can put the device back to sleep as we will program the nonce once we do the verification
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atsha204.sha204c_sleep();
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// Store nonce and replace the first byte in the nonce with our signing identifier
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memcpy(current_nonce, &rx_buffer[SHA204_BUFFER_POS_DATA], MAX_PAYLOAD);
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current_nonce[0] = SIGNING_IDENTIFIER;
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// Transfer the first part of the nonce to the message
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msg.set(current_nonce, MAX_PAYLOAD);
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verification_ongoing = true;
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timestamp = millis(); // Set timestamp to determine when to purge nonce
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// Be a little fancy to handle turnover (prolong the time allowed to timeout after turnover)
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// Note that if message is "too" quick, and arrives before turnover, it will be rejected
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// but this is consider such a rare case that it is accepted and rejects are 'safe'
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if (timestamp + MY_VERIFICATION_TIMEOUT_MS < millis()) timestamp = 0;
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return true;
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}
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bool MySigningAtsha204::checkTimer() {
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if (verification_ongoing) {
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if (millis() < timestamp || millis() > timestamp + MY_VERIFICATION_TIMEOUT_MS) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Verification timeout");
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// Purge nonce
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memset(current_nonce, 0xAA, NONCE_NUMIN_SIZE_PASSTHROUGH);
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verification_ongoing = false;
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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bool MySigningAtsha204::putNonce(MyMessage &msg) {
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if (mGetLength(msg) != MAX_PAYLOAD) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Incoming nonce with incorrect size");
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return false; // We require as big nonce as possible
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}
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if (((uint8_t*)msg.getCustom())[0] != SIGNING_IDENTIFIER) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Incorrect signing identifier");
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return false;
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}
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memcpy(current_nonce, (uint8_t*)msg.getCustom(), MAX_PAYLOAD);
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return true;
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}
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bool MySigningAtsha204::signMsg(MyMessage &msg) {
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// If we cannot fit any signature in the message, refuse to sign it
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if (mGetLength(msg) > MAX_PAYLOAD-2) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Cannot fit any signature to this message");
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return false;
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}
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// Calculate signature of message
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mSetSigned(msg, 1); // make sure signing flag is set before signature is calculated
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTBUF("Message to sign:", (uint8_t*)&msg.data[1-HEADER_SIZE], MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH-1-(MAX_PAYLOAD-mGetLength(msg)));
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if (!calculateSignature(msg)) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Failed to calculate signature");
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mSetSigned(msg, 0); // make sure signing flag is truthful
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return false;
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}
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// Transfer as much signature data as the remaining space in the message permits
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memcpy(&msg.data[mGetLength(msg)], &rx_buffer[SHA204_BUFFER_POS_DATA], MAX_PAYLOAD-mGetLength(msg));
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return true;
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}
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bool MySigningAtsha204::verifyMsg(MyMessage &msg) {
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if (!verification_ongoing) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("No active verification session");
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return false;
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} else {
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// Make sure we have not expired
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if (!checkTimer()) {
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return false;
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}
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verification_ongoing = false;
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if (msg.data[mGetLength(msg)] != SIGNING_IDENTIFIER) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Incorrect signing identifier");
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return false;
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}
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTBUF("Message to verify:", (uint8_t*)&msg.data[1-HEADER_SIZE], MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH-1-(MAX_PAYLOAD-mGetLength(msg)));
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTBUF("Signature in message:", (uint8_t*)&msg.data[mGetLength(msg)], MAX_PAYLOAD-mGetLength(msg));
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// Get signature of message
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if (!calculateSignature(msg)) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Failed to calculate signature");
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return false;
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}
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// Compare the caluclated signature with the provided signature
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if (memcmp(&msg.data[mGetLength(msg)], &rx_buffer[SHA204_BUFFER_POS_DATA], MAX_PAYLOAD-mGetLength(msg))) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTBUF("Signature bad. Calculated signature:", &rx_buffer[SHA204_BUFFER_POS_DATA], MAX_PAYLOAD-mGetLength(msg));
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return false;
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} else {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Signature ok");
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return true;
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}
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}
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}
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// Helper to calculate signature of msg (returned in rx_buffer[SHA204_BUFFER_POS_DATA])
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bool MySigningAtsha204::calculateSignature(MyMessage &msg) {
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memset(temp_message, 0, 32);
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memcpy(temp_message, (uint8_t*)&msg.data[1-HEADER_SIZE], MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH-1-(MAX_PAYLOAD-mGetLength(msg)));
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// Wake device before starting operations
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if (atsha204.sha204c_wakeup(rx_buffer) != SHA204_SUCCESS) return false;
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// Program the data to sign into the ATSHA204
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if (atsha204.sha204m_execute(SHA204_WRITE, SHA204_ZONE_DATA | SHA204_ZONE_COUNT_FLAG, 8 << 3, 32, temp_message,
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WRITE_COUNT_LONG, tx_buffer, WRITE_RSP_SIZE, rx_buffer) != SHA204_SUCCESS) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Failed to program data");
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return false;
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}
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// Program the nonce to use for the signature (has to be done just before GENDIG due to chip limitations)
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if (atsha204.sha204m_execute(SHA204_NONCE, NONCE_MODE_PASSTHROUGH, 0, NONCE_NUMIN_SIZE_PASSTHROUGH, current_nonce,
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NONCE_COUNT_LONG, tx_buffer, NONCE_RSP_SIZE_SHORT, rx_buffer) != SHA204_SUCCESS) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Failed to program nonce");
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// Purge nonce when used
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memset(current_nonce, 0xAA, NONCE_NUMIN_SIZE_PASSTHROUGH);
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return false;
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}
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// Purge nonce when used
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memset(current_nonce, 0xAA, NONCE_NUMIN_SIZE_PASSTHROUGH);
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// Generate digest of data and nonce
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if (atsha204.sha204m_execute(SHA204_GENDIG, GENDIG_ZONE_DATA, 8, 0, NULL,
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GENDIG_COUNT_DATA, tx_buffer, GENDIG_RSP_SIZE, rx_buffer) != SHA204_SUCCESS) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Failed to generate digest");
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return false;
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}
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// Calculate HMAC of message+nonce digest and secret key
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if (atsha204.sha204m_execute(SHA204_HMAC, HMAC_MODE_SOURCE_FLAG_MATCH, 0, 0, NULL,
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HMAC_COUNT, tx_buffer, HMAC_RSP_SIZE, rx_buffer) != SHA204_SUCCESS) {
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTLN("Failed to generate HMAC");
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return false;
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}
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// Put device back to sleep
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atsha204.sha204c_sleep();
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// Overwrite the first byte in the signature with the signing identifier
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rx_buffer[SHA204_BUFFER_POS_DATA] = SIGNING_IDENTIFIER;
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DEBUG_ATSHA_PRINTBUF("HMAC:", &rx_buffer[SHA204_BUFFER_POS_DATA], 32);
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return true; // We return with the signature in rx_buffer[SHA204_BUFFER_POS_DATA]
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}
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