Patrick Fallberg
7e6db413c7
* Removed ability to lock data section * Introduced "guided mode" to simplify process * Refactored the sketch to be less monolithic * Print details and instructions in tables * Use device unique ID as serial when * Calculate and store personalization checksum * Print serial in a copy+paste friendly manner (fixes #804) * Clarify meaning of UART confirmation (fixes #805)
683 lines
43 KiB
C
683 lines
43 KiB
C
/*
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* The MySensors Arduino library handles the wireless radio link and protocol
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* between your home built sensors/actuators and HA controller of choice.
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* The sensors forms a self healing radio network with optional repeaters. Each
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* repeater and gateway builds a routing tables in EEPROM which keeps track of the
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* network topology allowing messages to be routed to nodes.
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*
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* Created by Henrik Ekblad <henrik.ekblad@mysensors.org>
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* Copyright (C) 2013-2017 Sensnology AB
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* Full contributor list: https://github.com/mysensors/Arduino/graphs/contributors
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*
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* Documentation: http://www.mysensors.org
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* Support Forum: http://forum.mysensors.org
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*/
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/**
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* @defgroup MySigninggrp MySigning
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* @ingroup internals
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* @{
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*
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* @brief The signing driver provides a generic API for various signing backends to offer
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* signing of MySensors messages.
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*
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* Signing support created by Patrick "Anticimex" Fallberg <patrick@fallberg.net>
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*
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* @section MySigninggrpbackground Background and concepts
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*
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* Suppose two participants, Alice and Bob, wants to exchange a message. Alice sends a message to Bob. In MySensors “language” Alice
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* could be a gateway and Bob an actuator (light swich, electronic lock, etc). But to be generic, we will substitute the term
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* “gateway” with Alice and a “node” with Bob (although the reverse relationship is also supported).
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*
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* Alice sends a message to Bob. This message can be heard by anyone who wants to listen (and also by anyone that is within “hearing”
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* distance). Normally, this is perhaps not a big issue. Nothing Alice says to Bob may be secret or sensitive in any way.
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* However, sometimes (or perhaps always) Bob want to be sure that the message Bob receives actually came from Alice. In cryptography,
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* this is known as <i>authenticity</i>. Bob needs some way of determining that the message is authentic from Alice, when Bob receives it.
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* This prevents an eavesdropper, Eve, to trick Bob into thinking it was Alice that sent a message Eve in fact transmitted. Bob also needs
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* to know how to determine if the message has been repeated. Eve could record a message sent by Alice that Bob accepted and then send
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* the same message again. Eve could also in some way prevent Bob from receiving the message and delay it in order to permit the message
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* to arrive to Bob at a time Eve chooses, instead of Alice. Such an attack is known as a <b>replay attack</b>.<br>
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* <i>Authenticity</i> permits Bob to determine if Alice is the true sender of a message.
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* @image html MySigning/alicenfriends.png
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* @image latex MySigning/alicenfriends.eps "Alice with Eve and Bob" width=6cm
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*
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* It can also be interesting for Bob to know that the message Alice sent has not been tampered with in any way. This is the
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* <i>integrity</i> of the message. We now introduce Mallory, who could be intercepting the communication between Alice and Bob and
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* replace some parts of the message but keeping the parts that authenticate the message. That way, Bob still trusts Alice to be the
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* source, but the contents of the message was not the content Alice sent. Bob needs to be able to determine that the contents of the
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* message was not altered after Alice sent it.<br>
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* Mallory would in this case be a <b>man-in-the-middle</b> attacker.<br>
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* <i>Integrity</i> permits Bob to verify that the messages received from Alice has not been tampered with.<br>
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* This is achieved by adding a <i>signature</i> to the message, which Bob can inspect to validate that Alice is the author.
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* @image html MySigning/alicenfriends2.png
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* @image latex MySigning/alicenfriends2.eps "Alice with Mallory and Bob" width=9cm
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*
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* The signing scheme used, needs to address both these attack scenarios. Neither Eve nor Mallory must be permitted to interfere with the
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* message exchange between Alice and Bob.
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*
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* The key challenge to implementing a secure signing scheme is to ensure that every signature is different, even if the message is not.
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* If not, <b>replay attacks</b> would be very hard to prevent.<br>
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* One way of doing this is to increment some counter on the sender side and include it in the signature. This is however predictable.<br>
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* A better option would be to introduce a random number to the signature. That way, it is impossible to predict what the signature will be.
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* The problem is, that also makes it impossible for the receiver (Bob) to verify that the signature is valid.<br>
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* A solution to this is to let Bob generate the random number, keep it in memory and send it to Alice. Alice can then use the random number
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* in the signature calculation and send the signed message back to Bob who can validate the signature with the random number used.
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* This random number is in cryptography known as a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_nonce">nonce</a> or
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* <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_%28cryptography%29">salt</a>.
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*
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* However, Mallory might be eavesdropping on the communication and snoop up the nonce in order to generate a new valid signature for a
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* different message. To counter this, both Alice and Bob keep a secret that only they know. This secret is never transmitted over the air,
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* nor is it revealed to anybody. This secret is known as a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pre-shared_key"> pre-shared key</a> (PSK).
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*
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* If Eve or Mallory are really sophisticated, he/she might use a <b>delayed replay attack</b>. This can be done by allowing Bob to transmit
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* a nonce to Alice. But when Alice transmits the uniquely signed message, Mallory prevents Bob from receiving it, to a point when Mallory
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* decides Bob should receive it. An example of such an attack is described
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* <a href="http://spencerwhyte.blogspot.se/2014/03/delay-attack-jam-intercept-and-replay.html">here</a>.<br>
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* This needs to be addressed as well, and one way of doing this is to have Bob keep track of time between a transmitted nonce and a signed
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* message to verify. If Bob is asked for a nonce, Bob knows that a signed message is going to arrive “soon”. Bob can then decide that if the
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* signed message does not arrive within a predefined timeframe, Bob throws away the generated nonce and thus makes it impossible to verify
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* the message if it arrives late.
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*
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* The flow can be described like this:
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* @image html MySigning/alicenbob.png
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* @image latex MySigning/alicenbob.eps "Alice and Bob" width=8cm
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* The benefits for MySensors to support this are obvious. Nobody wants others to be able to control or manipulate any actuators in their home.
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*
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* @section MySigninggrpencryption Why encryption is not part of this
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*
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* Well, some could be uncomfortable with somebody being able to snoop temperatures, motion or the state changes of locks in the environment.
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* Signing does <b>not</b> address these issues. Encryption is needed to prevent this.<br>
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* It is my personal standpoint that encryption should not be part of the MySensors “protocol”. The reason is that a gateway and a node does
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* not really care about messages being readable or not by “others”. It makes more sense that such guarantees are provided by the underlying
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* transmission layer (RF solution in this case). It is the information transmitted over the air that needs to be secret (if user so desires).
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* The “trust” level on the other hand needs to go all the way into the sketches (who might have different requirements of trust depending on
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* the message participant), and for this reason, it is more important (and less complicated) to ensure authenticity and <i>integrity</i> at
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* protocol-level as message contents is still readable throughout the protocol stack. But as soon as the message leaves the “stack” it can be
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* scramble into “garbage” when transmitted over the air and then reassembled by a receiving node before being fed in “the clear” up the stack
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* at the receiving end.
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*
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* There are methods and possibilities to provide encryption also in software, but if this is done, it is my recommendation that this is done
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* after integrity- and authentication information has been provided to the message (if this is desired). Integrity and authentication is of
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* course not mandatory and some might be happy with only having encryption to cover their need for security. I, however, have only focused on
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* <i>integrity</i> and <i>authenticity</i> while at the same time keeping the current message routing mechanisms intact and therefore leave
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* the matter of <i>secrecy</i> to be implemented in the “physical” transport layer. With the <i>integrity</i> and <i>authenticity</i> handled
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* in the protocol it ought to be enough for a simple encryption (nonce-less AES with a PSK for instance) on the message as it is sent to the
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* RF backend. Atmel does provide such circuits as well but I have not investigated the matter further as it given the current size of the
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* ethernet gateway sketch is close to the size limit on an Arduino Nano, so it will be difficult to fit this into some existing gateway
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* designs.<br>
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* Also it is worth to consider that the state of a lock can just as readily be determined by simply looking at the door in question or
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* attempting to open it, so obfuscating this information will not necessarily deter an attacker in any way.<br>
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* Nevertheless, I do acknowledge that people find the fact that all information is sent “in the clear” even if it require some technical
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* effort for an intruder to obtain and inspect this information. So I do encourage the use of encrypting transport layers.<br>
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* This is however not covered by this implementation.
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*
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* @section MySigninggrphow How this is done
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*
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* There exist many forms of message signature solutions to combat Eve and Mallory.<br>
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* Most of these solutions are quite complex in term of computations, so I elected to use an algorithm that an external circuit is able to
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* process. This has the added benefit of protecting any keys and intermediate data used for calculating the signature so that even if
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* someone were to actually steal a sensor and disassembled it, they would not be able to extract the keys and other information from the
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* device.<br>
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* A common scheme for message signing (authenticity and integrity) is implemented using
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* <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash-based_message_authentication_code">HMAC</a> which in combination with a strong
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* <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash_function"> hash function</a> provides a very strong level of protection.<br>
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* The <a href="http://www.atmel.com/devices/ATSHA204A.aspx">Atmel ATSHA204A</a> is a low-cost, low-voltage/current circuit that provides
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* HMAC calculation capabilities with SHA256 hashing which is a (currently) virtually unbreakable combination. If SHA256 were to be hacked,
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* a certain <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin">cryptocurrency</a> would immediately be rendered worthless.<br>
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* The ATSHA device also contain a random number generator (RNG) which enables the generation of a good nonce, as in,
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* <i>non-predictable</i>.<br>
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* As I acknowledge that some might not want to use an additional external circuit, I have also implemented a software version of the ATSHA
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* device, capable of generating the same signatures as the ATSHA device does. Because it is pure-software however, it does not provide as
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* good nonces (it uses the <a href="http://arduino.cc/en/reference/random">Arduino pseudo-random generator</a>) and the HMAC key is stored
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* in SW and is therefore readable if the memory is dumped. It also naturally claims more flash space due to the more complex software. But
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* for indoor sensors/actuators this might be good enough for most people.
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*
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* @section MySigninggrphowuse How to use this
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*
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* Before we begin with the details, I just want to emphasize that signing is completely optional and not enabled by default. If you do want
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* the additional security layer signing provides, you pick the backend of your choise in your sketch. Currently, two compatible backends are
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* supported; @ref MY_SIGNING_ATSHA204 (hardware backed) and @ref MY_SIGNING_SOFT (software backed). You can either enable these globally in
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* @ref MyConfig.h or in your sketch for sketch specific/local use.
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*
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* <b>Firstly</b>, you need to make sure to pick a backend to use as described above.
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* @code{.cpp}
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* //#define MY_SIGNING_SOFT
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* #define MY_SIGNING_ATSHA204
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* #include <MySensors.h>
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* ...
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* @endcode
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* Make sure to set the define before the inclusion of MySensors.h.
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* It is legal to mix hardware- and software-based backends in a network. They work together.
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*
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* You also need to decide if the node (or gateway) in question require and verify signatures in addition to calculating them.
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* This has to be set by at least one of the node in a "pair" or nobody will actually start calculating a signature for a message.
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* Just set the flag @ref MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES and the node will inform the gateway that it expects the gateway to sign all
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* messages sent to the node. If this is set in a gateway, it will @b NOT force all nodes to sign messages to it. It will only require
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* signatures from nodes that in turn require signatures. If it is desired that the gateway should require signatures from all nodes,
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* @ref MY_SIGNING_GW_REQUEST_SIGNATURES_FROM_ALL can be set in the gateway sketch.<br>
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* If you want to have two nodes communicate securely directly with each other, the nodes that require signatures must send a presentation
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* message to all nodes it expect signed messages from (only the gateway is informed automatically). See @ref signerPresentation().<br>
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* A node can have three "states" with respect to signing:
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* 1. Node does not support signing in any way (neither @ref MY_SIGNING_ATSHA204 nor @ref MY_SIGNING_SOFT is set)
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* 2. Node does support signing but don't require messages sent to it to be signed (@ref MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES is not set)
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* 3. Node does support signing and require messages sent to it to be signed (@ref MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES is set)
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*
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* <b>Secondly</b>, you need to verify the configuration for the backend.<br>
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* For hardware backed signing it is the pin the device is connected to. In MyConfig.h there are defaults which you might need to adjust to
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* match your personal build. The setting is defined using @ref MY_SIGNING_ATSHA204_PIN and the default is to use pin A3.<br>
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* Similar to picking your backend, this can also be set in your sketch:
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* @code{.cpp}
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* #define MY_SIGNING_ATSHA204
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* #define MY_SIGNING_ATSHA204_PIN 4
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* #define MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES
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* #include <MySensors.h>
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* ...
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* @endcode
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* For the software backed signingbackend, an unconnected analog pin is required to set a random seed for the pseudo-random generator.
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* It is important that the pin is floating, or the output of the pseudo-random generator will be predictable, and thus compromise the
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* signatures. The setting is defined using @ref MY_SIGNING_SOFT_RANDOMSEED_PIN and the default is to use pin A7. The same configuration
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* possibilities exist as with the other configuration options.
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*
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* <b>Thirdly</b>, if you use the software backend, you need to personalize the node (see @ref personalization).
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* @code{.cpp}
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* #define MY_SIGNING_SOFT
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* #define MY_SIGNING_SOFT_RANDOMSEED_PIN 7
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* #define MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES
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* #include <MySensors.h>
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* ...
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* @endcode
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*
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* An example of a node that require signatures is available in @ref SecureActuator.ino.
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*
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* @anchor personalization If you use the “real” ATSHA204A, before any signing operations can be done, the device needs to be <i>personalized</i>.
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* This can be a daunting process as it involves irreversibly writing configurations to the device, which cannot be undone. I have however tried
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* to simplify the process as much as possibly by creating a helper-sketch specifically for this purpose in @ref SecurityPersonalizer.ino
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* Note that you also need to do personalization for software signing, but then the values are stored in EEPROM.
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*
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* To personalize a ATSHA204A do the following procedure:
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* 1. Enable @ref GENERATE_KEYS_ATSHA204A<br>
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* This will lock the ATSHA204A and generate random keys for HMAC (signing) and AES (encryption).
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* Copy the keys generated and replace the corresponding definitions under
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* "User defined key data", specifically @ref MY_HMAC_KEY and @ref MY_AES_KEY.
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* 2. Disable @ref GENERATE_KEYS_ATSHA204A and enable @ref PERSONALIZE_ATSHA204A<br>
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* This will store the HMAC key to the ATSHA204A and the AES key to EEPROM. It will also write
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* a checksum of the personalization data in EEPROM to be able to detect if the data is
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* altered.<br>
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* Personalization is now complete.
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*
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* To personalize for software signing do the following procedure:
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* 1. Enable @ref GENERATE_KEYS_SOFT<br>
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* This will generate random keys for HMAC (signing) and AES (encryption).
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* Copy the keys generated and replace the corresponding definitions under
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* "User defined key data", specifically @ref MY_HMAC_KEY and @ref MY_AES_KEY.
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* 2. Disable @ref GENERATE_KEYS_SOFT and enable @ref PERSONALIZE_SOFT<br>
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* This will store the HMAC key and the AES key to EEPROM. It will also write
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* a checksum of the personalization data in EEPROM to be able to detect if the data is
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* altered.<br>
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* Personalization is now complete.
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*
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* If you want to use soft signing and you want to use whitelisting (the ability to revoke/ban
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* compromised nodes in the network) and your target does not provide a unique device ID, you have
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* to generate a unique serial and store it in EEPROM. This can be done by replacing
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* @ref PERSONALIZE_SOFT in step 2 above with @ref PERSONALIZE_SOFT_RANDOM_SERIAL. See the output
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* under "Hardware security peripherals" to determine if this is necessary.
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*
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* When you have personalized your first device after step 2 above, you can run the same sketch on
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* all devices in your network that needs to be personalized in a compatible manner. Pick
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* @ref PERSONALIZE_ATSHA204A or @ref PERSONALIZE_SOFT as needed by the hardware.
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*
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* If a node does require signing, any unsigned message sent to the node will be rejected.<br>
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* This also applies to the gateway. However, the difference is that the gateway will only require signed messages from nodes it knows in turn
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* require signed messages (unless @ref MY_SIGNING_GW_REQUEST_SIGNATURES_FROM_ALL is set).<br>
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* A node can also inform a different node that it expects to receive signed messages from it. This is done by transmitting an internal message
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* of type @ref I_SIGNING_PRESENTATION and provide flags as payload that inform the receiver of the signing preferences of the sender.<br>
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* All nodes and gateways in a network maintain a table where the signing preferences of all nodes are stored. This is also stored in EEPROM so
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* if the gateway reboots, the nodes does not have to retransmit a signing presentation to the gateway for the gateway to realize that the node
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* expect signed messages.<br>
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* Also, the nodes that do not require signed messages will also inform gateway of this, so if you reprogram a node to stop require signing,
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* the gateway will adhere to this as soon as the new node has presented itself to the gateway. Note however, that if the gateway sets
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* @ref MY_SIGNING_GW_REQUEST_SIGNATURES_FROM_ALL a node that does not support signing will be unable to send any data to the gateway.
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*
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* The following sequence diagram illustrate how messages are passed in a MySensors network with respect to signing:
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* @image html MySigning/signingsequence.png
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* @image latex MySigning/signingsequence.eps "Signing sequence diagram" width=9cm
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*
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* None of this activity is “visible” to you (as the sensor sketch implementor). All you need to do is to set your preferences in MyConfig.h or
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* in your sketch. Depending on chosen backend, do personalization or key configurations and set @ref MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES on the node that
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* you want protected. That is enough to enable protection from both Eve and Mallory in your network (although if you do not also enable encryption,
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* Eve can eavesdrop, but not do anything about, your messages).
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*
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* @section MySigningwhitelisting Whitelisting and node revocation
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*
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* Consider the situation when you have set up your secure topology. We use the remotely operated garage door as an example:
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* - You have a node inside your garage (therefore secure and out of reach from prying eyes) that controls your garage door motor.\n
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* This node requires signing since you do not want an unauthorized person sending it orders to open the door.
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* - You have a keyfob node with a signing backend that uses the same PSK as your door opener node.
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*
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* In this setup, your keyfob can securely transmit messages to your door node since the keyfob will sign the messages it sends and the door node
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* will verify that these were sent from a trusted node (since it used the correct PSK). If the keyfob does not sign the messages, the door node
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* will not accept them.
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*
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* One day your keyfob gets stolen or you lost it or it simply broke down.
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*
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* You now end up with a problem; you need some way of telling your door node that the keyfob in question cannot be trusted any more. Furthermore,
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* you maybe locked the data region in your door nodes ATSHA device and is not able to revoke/change your PSK, or you have some other reason for
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* not wanting to replace the PSK. How do you make sure that the "rogue" keyfob can be removed from the "trusted chain"?
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*
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* The answer to this is whitelisting. You let your door node keep a whitelist of all nodes it trusts. If you stop trusting a particular node, you
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* remove it from the nodes whitelist, and it will no longer be able to communicate signed messages to the door node.
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*
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* In case you want to be able to "whitelist" trusted nodes (in order to be able to revoke them in case they are lost) you also need to take note
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* of the serial number of the ATSHA device or the software value stored in EEPROM. This is unique for each device. The serial number is printed
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* in a copy+paste friendly format by the personalizer for this purpose.<br>
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* The whitelist is stored on the node that require signatures. When a received message is verified, the serial of the sender is looked up in a
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* list stored on the receiving node, and the corresponding serial stored in the list for that sender is then included in the signature verification
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* process. The list is stored as the value of the flag that enables whitelisting, @ref MY_SIGNING_NODE_WHITELISTING.<br>
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*
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* Whitelisting is achieved by 'salting' the signature with some node-unique information known to the receiver. In the case of ATSHA204A this is the
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* unique serial number programmed into the circuit. This unique number is never transmitted over the air in clear text, so Eve will not be able to
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* figure out a "trusted" serial by snooping on the traffic.<br>
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* Instead the value is hashed together with the senders NodeId into the HMAC signature to produce the final signature. The receiver will then take
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* the originating NodeId of the signed message and do the corresponding calculation with the serial it has stored in it's whitelist if it finds a
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* matching entry in it's whitelist.
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*
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* Whitelisting is an optional alternative because it adds some code and configuration options which might not be desirable for every user. So if
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* you want the ability to use whitelists, you need to enable @ref MY_SIGNING_NODE_WHITELISTING.<br>
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* The whitelist is provided as value of the flag that enable it as follows (example is a node that require signing as well):
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* @code{.cpp}
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* #define MY_SIGNING_ATSHA204
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* #define MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES
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* #define MY_SIGNING_NODE_WHITELISTING {{.nodeId = GATEWAY_ADDRESS,.serial = {0x09,0x08,0x07,0x06,0x05,0x04,0x03,0x02,0x01}},{.nodeId = 2,.serial = {0x01,0x02,0x03,0x04,0x05,0x06,0x07,0x08,0x09}}}
|
|
* #include <MySensors.h>
|
|
* ...
|
|
* @endcode
|
|
* In this example, there are two nodes in the whitelist; the gateway, and a separate node that communicates directly with this node (with signed
|
|
* messages). You do not need to do anything special for the sending nodes, apart from making sure they support signing.
|
|
*
|
|
* The "soft" backend of course also support whitelisting. Example:
|
|
* @code{.cpp}
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_SOFT
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_SOFT_RANDOMSEED_PIN 7
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_NODE_WHITELISTING {{.nodeId = GATEWAY_ADDRESS,.serial = {0x09,0x08,0x07,0x06,0x05,0x04,0x03,0x02,0x01}},{.nodeId = 2,.serial = {0x01,0x02,0x03,0x04,0x05,0x06,0x07,0x08,0x09}}}
|
|
* #include <MySensors.h>
|
|
* ...
|
|
* @endcode
|
|
*
|
|
* For a node that should transmit whitelisted messages but not receive whitelisted messages, you do not need any special configurations:
|
|
* @code{.cpp}
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_SOFT
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_SOFT_RANDOMSEED_PIN 7
|
|
* @endcode
|
|
* Remember that you always need to select a signing backend for all nodes that communicate to a node that require whitelisting.
|
|
* Also, note that a node that use whitelisting will not accept messages from nodes that are not present in it's whitelist.
|
|
* And you have to personalize all nodes that use signing with a common HMAC key but different serial numbers (ATSHA204A always has unique serials).
|
|
*
|
|
* @section MySigningtechnical The technical stuff
|
|
*
|
|
* How are the messages actually affected by the signing?<br>
|
|
* The following illustration shows what part of the message is signed, and where the signature is stored:
|
|
* @image html MySigning/signingillustrated1.png
|
|
* @image latex MySigning/signingillustrated1.eps "Message structure" width=11cm
|
|
*
|
|
* The first byte of the header is not covered by the signature, because in the network, this byte is used to track hops in the network and therefore
|
|
* might change if the message is passing a relay node. So it cannot be part of the signature, or the signature would be invalid when it arrives to
|
|
* its destination. The signature also carries a byte with a signing identifier to prevent false results from accidental mixing of incompatible
|
|
* signing backends in the network. Thus, the maximum size for a payload is 29-7 bytes. Larger payloads are not possible to sign. Another thing to
|
|
* consider is that the strength of the signature is inversely proportional to the payload size.
|
|
*
|
|
* As for the software backend, it turns out that the ATSHA does not do “vanilla” HMAC processing. Fortunately, Atmel has documented exactly how
|
|
* the circuit processes the data and hashes thus making it possible to generate signatures that are identical to signatures generated by the circuit.
|
|
*
|
|
* The signatures are calculates in the following way:
|
|
* @image html MySigning/signingillustrated2.png
|
|
* @image latex MySigning/signingillustrated2.eps "HMAC processing" width=10cm
|
|
*
|
|
* Exactly how this is done can be reviewd in the source for the ATSHA204SOFT backend and the ATSHA204A
|
|
* <a href="http://www.atmel.com/Images/Atmel-8885-CryptoAuth-ATSHA204A-Datasheet.pdf">datasheet</a>.
|
|
* In the MySensors protocol, the following internal messagetypes handles signature requirements and nonce requests:<br>
|
|
* @ref I_SIGNING_PRESENTATION <br>
|
|
* @ref I_NONCE_REQUEST <br>
|
|
* @ref I_NONCE_RESPONSE <br>
|
|
*
|
|
* Also, the version field in the header has been reduced from 3 to 2 bits in order to fit a single bit to indicate that a message is signed.
|
|
*
|
|
* @section MySigninglimitations Known limitations
|
|
*
|
|
* Due to the limiting factor of our cheapest Arduino nodes, the use of diversified keys is not implemented. That mean that all nodes in your
|
|
* network share the same PSK (at least the ones that are supposed to exchange signed data). It is important to understand the implications of
|
|
* this, and that is covered in the "Typical use cases" chapter below.<br>
|
|
* Also be reminded that the strength of the signature is inversely proportional to the size of the message. The larger the message, the weaker
|
|
* the signature.
|
|
*
|
|
* @section MySigningusecases Typical use cases
|
|
*
|
|
* "Securely located" in this context mean a node which is not physically publicly accessible. Typically at least your gateway.<br>
|
|
* "Public" in this context mean a node that is located outside your "trusted environment". This includes sensors located outdoors, keyfobs etc.
|
|
*
|
|
* @subsection MySigninglock Securely located lock
|
|
*
|
|
* You have a securely located gateway and a lock somewhere inside your "trusted environment" (e.g. inside your house door, the door to your
|
|
* dungeon or similar).<br>
|
|
* You should then keep the data section of your gateway and your lock node unlocked. Locking the data (and therefore the PSK) will require you
|
|
* to replace at least the signing circuit in case you need to revoke the PSK because some other node in your network gets compromised.<br>
|
|
* You need to make your node require signed messages but you do not necessarily need to make your gateway require signed messsages (unless you
|
|
* are concerned that someone might spoof the lock status of your lock).<br>
|
|
* Configuration example for the secure lock node:<br>
|
|
* @code{.cpp}
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_ATSHA204
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES
|
|
* #include <MySensors.h>
|
|
* ...
|
|
* @endcode
|
|
* If you do also want your gateway to require signatures from your lock you just enable the same (or similar if using software signing) settings
|
|
* in the gateway.
|
|
*
|
|
* @subsection MySigningpatio Patio motion sensor
|
|
*
|
|
* Your gateway is securely located inside your house, but your motion sensor is located outside your house. You have for some reason elected
|
|
* that this node should sign the messages it send to your gateway. You should lock the data (PSK) in this node then, because if someone were
|
|
* to steal your patio motion sensor, they could rewrite the firmware and spoof your gateway to use it to transmit a correctly signed message
|
|
* to your secure lock inside your house. But if you revoke your gateway (and lock) PSK the outside sensor cannot be used for this anymore.
|
|
* Nor can it be changed in order to do it in the future. You can also use whitelisting to revoke your lost node.<br>
|
|
* This is an unlikely use case because there really is no reason to sign sensor values. If you for some reason want to obfuscate sensor data,
|
|
* encryption is a better alternative.<br>
|
|
* Configuration example for a motion sensor:<br>
|
|
* @code{.cpp}
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_SOFT
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_SOFT_RANDOMSEED_PIN 7
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES
|
|
* #include <MySensors.h>
|
|
* ...
|
|
* @endcode
|
|
*
|
|
* The gateway needs to be configured with a whitelist (and it has to have an entry for all nodes that send and/or require signed messages):<br>
|
|
* @code{.cpp}
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_SOFT
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_SOFT_RANDOMSEED_PIN 7
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_NODE_WHITELISTING {{.nodeId = MOTION_SENSOR_ID,.serial = {0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0x90,0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78}}}
|
|
* #include <MySensors.h>
|
|
* ...
|
|
* @endcode
|
|
|
|
* @subsection MySigningkeyfob Keyfob for garage door opener
|
|
*
|
|
* Perhaps the most typical usecase for signed messages. Your keyfob should be totally locked down. If the garage door opener is secured
|
|
* (and it should be) it can be unlocked. That way, if you loose your keyfob, you can revoke the PSK in both the opener and your gateway,
|
|
* thus rendering the keyfob useless without having to replace your nodes. You can also use whitelisting to revoke your lost keyfob.<br>
|
|
* Configuration example for the keyfob (keyfob will only transmit to another node and not receive anything):<br>
|
|
* @code{.cpp}
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_ATSHA204
|
|
* #include <MySensors.h>
|
|
* ...
|
|
* @endcode
|
|
*
|
|
* Configuration example for the door controller node (should require signing from anyone who wants to control it):<br>
|
|
* @code{.cpp}
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_SOFT
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_SOFT_RANDOMSEED_PIN 7
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES
|
|
* #define MY_SIGNING_NODE_WHITELISTING {{.nodeId = GATEWAY_ADDRESS,.serial = {0x00,0x11,0x22,0x33,0x44,0x55,0x66,0x77,0x88}},{.nodeId = KEYFOB_ID,.serial = {<FROM ATSHA ON KEYFOB>}}}
|
|
* #include <MySensors.h>
|
|
* ...
|
|
* @endcode
|
|
*
|
|
* @subsection MySigningsketches Relevant sketches
|
|
*
|
|
* - @ref SecureActuator.ino
|
|
* - @ref SecurityPersonalizer.ino
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @file MySigning.h
|
|
*
|
|
* @brief API declaration for MySigning signing backend
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef MySigning_h
|
|
#define MySigning_h
|
|
|
|
#include "MySensorsCore.h"
|
|
#include "drivers/ATSHA204/ATSHA204.h"
|
|
|
|
#ifdef MY_SIGNING_NODE_WHITELISTING
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
uint8_t nodeId; /**< @brief The ID of the node */
|
|
uint8_t serial[SHA204_SERIAL_SZ]; /**< @brief Node specific serial number */
|
|
} whitelist_entry_t;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/** @brief Helper macro to determine the number of elements in a array */
|
|
#define NUM_OF(x) (sizeof(x)/sizeof(x[0]))
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief Initializes signing infrastructure and associated backend.
|
|
*
|
|
* This function makes sure that the internal states of the signing infrastructure
|
|
* is set to a known initial state.
|
|
* \n@b Usage: This fuction should be called before any signing related operations take place.
|
|
*/
|
|
void signerInit(void);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief Validates personalization data
|
|
*
|
|
* This function checks that the personalization details are in order.
|
|
* \n@b Usage: This fuction should be called before any signing related operations take place.
|
|
*
|
|
* @returns @c true if personalization data is valid.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool signerValidatePersonalization(void);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief Does signing specific presentation for a node.
|
|
*
|
|
* This function makes sure any signing related presentation info is shared with the other part.
|
|
* The presentation of the gateways signing preferences is done in @ref signerProcessInternal().
|
|
* \n@b Usage: This function should be called by the presentation routine of the mysensors library.
|
|
* You only need to call this directly from a sketch to set up a node to node signed message exchange.
|
|
* If you do call this directly from a sketch, and you at some point change your sketch to go from
|
|
* requireing signing to not requireing signatures, you need to present this change to the node at least
|
|
* once, so it can update its requirements tables accordingly. Or it will keep believing that this node
|
|
* require signatures and attempt to send signed messages to it.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param msg Message buffer to use.
|
|
* @param destination Node ID of the destination.
|
|
*/
|
|
void signerPresentation(MyMessage &msg, uint8_t destination);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief Manages internal signing message handshaking.
|
|
*
|
|
* This function takes care of signing related message handshaknig such as nonce exchange.
|
|
* \n@b Usage: This function should be called by the incoming message handler before any further message
|
|
* processing is performed on internal messages. This function should only be called for @ref C_INTERNAL class
|
|
* messages.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param msg Message buffer to process.
|
|
* @returns @c true if caller should stop further message processing.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool signerProcessInternal(MyMessage &msg);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief Check timeout of verification session.
|
|
*
|
|
* Nonce will be purged if it takes too long for a signed message to be sent to the receiver.
|
|
* \n@b Usage: This function should be called on regular intervals, typically within some process loop.
|
|
*
|
|
* @returns @c true if session is still valid.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool signerCheckTimer(void);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief Get nonce from provided message and store for signing operations.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns @c false if subsystem is busy processing an ongoing signing operation.<br>
|
|
* Returns @c false if signing identifier found in message is not supported by the used backend.<br>
|
|
* If successful, this marks the start of a signing operation at the sending side so
|
|
* implementation is expected to do any necessary initializations within this call.
|
|
* \n@b Usage: This function is typically called as action when receiving a @ref I_NONCE_RESPONSE
|
|
* message.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param msg The message to get the nonce from.
|
|
* @returns @c true if successful, else @c false.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool signerPutNonce(MyMessage &msg);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief Signs provided message. All remaining space in message payload buffer is used for
|
|
* signing identifier and signature.
|
|
*
|
|
* Nonce used for signature calculation is the one generated previously within @ref signerProcessInternal().<br>
|
|
* Nonce will be cleared when this function is called to prevent re-use of nonce.<br>
|
|
* Returns @c false if subsystem is busy processing an ongoing signing operation.<br>
|
|
* Returns @c false if not two bytes or more of free payload space is left in provided message.<br>
|
|
* This ends a signing operation at the sending side so implementation is expected to do any
|
|
* deinitializations and enter a power saving state within this call.
|
|
* \n@b Usage: This function is typically called as action when receiving a @ref I_NONCE_RESPONSE
|
|
* message and after @ref signerPutNonce() has successfully been executed.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param msg The message to sign.
|
|
* @returns @c true if successful, else @c false.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool signerSignMsg(MyMessage &msg);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief Verifies signature in provided message.
|
|
*
|
|
* Nonce used for verification is the one previously set using @ref signerPutNonce().<br>
|
|
* Nonce will be cleared when this function is called to prevent re-use of nonce.<br>
|
|
* Returns @c false if subsystem is busy processing an ongoing signing operation.<br>
|
|
* Returns @c false if signing identifier found in message is not supported by the used backend.<br>
|
|
* This ends a signing operation at the receiving side so implementation is expected to do any
|
|
* deinitializations and enter a power saving state within this call.
|
|
* \n@b Usage: This function is typically called when receiving a message that is flagged as signed
|
|
* and @ref MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES is activated.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param msg The message to verify.
|
|
* @returns @c true if successful, else @c false.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool signerVerifyMsg(MyMessage &msg);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief Initialize a hash calculation session.
|
|
*
|
|
* Any ongoing calculation session will be terminated/reset.
|
|
*/
|
|
void signerSha256Init(void);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief Add data to an ongoing hash calculation session.
|
|
*
|
|
* More data can be added by repeated calls to this function.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param data Buffer with data to add.
|
|
* @param sz Size of data buffer.
|
|
*/
|
|
void signerSha256Update(const uint8_t* data, size_t sz);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief Finalize an ongong hash calculation session and return the hash.
|
|
*
|
|
* The returned hash size is always 32 bytes. Buffer can be assumed to be valid
|
|
* until @ref signerSha256Init() is called again.
|
|
*
|
|
* @returns Buffer with 32-byte hash.
|
|
*/
|
|
uint8_t* signerSha256Final(void);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @brief Do a timing neutral memory comparison.
|
|
*
|
|
* The function behaves similar to memcmp with the difference that it will
|
|
* always use the same number of instructions for a given number of bytes,
|
|
* no matter how the two buffers differ and the response is either 0 or -1.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param a First buffer for comparison.
|
|
* @param b Second buffer for comparison.
|
|
* @param sz The number of bytes to compare.
|
|
* @returns 0 if buffers match, -1 if they do not.
|
|
*/
|
|
int signerMemcmp(const void* a, const void* b, size_t sz);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
/** @}*/
|
|
/**
|
|
* @defgroup MySigningTroubleshootinggrp Troubleshooting
|
|
* @ingroup MySigninggrp
|
|
* @{
|
|
*
|
|
* @section MySigningTroubleshootingSymptoms Symptoms and solutions
|
|
*
|
|
* The first thing to do if you suspect signing is causing problems, is to enable the verbose debug
|
|
* flag for the signing backend. @see MY_DEBUG_VERBOSE_SIGNING
|
|
*
|
|
* If you are having trouble getting signing to work, please see the following troubleshooting tips.
|
|
*
|
|
* @subsection MySigningTroubleshootingSymptomStFail Signing fails and logs show st=fail on transmissions
|
|
*
|
|
* This is actually not a signing problem, although ofthen st=fail becomes st=ok when signing is disabled.
|
|
* This is by far the most commonly reported problem with signing, but the problems is not with signing,
|
|
* it is with radio performence.<br>
|
|
* This is a typical log which might look like a signing related issue but isn't:
|
|
* @code{.unparsed}
|
|
* 0;255;3;0;9;Skipping security for command 3 type 16
|
|
* 0;255;3;0;9;read: 3-3-0 s=255,c=3,t=16,pt=0,l=0,sg=0:
|
|
* 0;255;3;0;9;Signing backend: ATSHA204Soft
|
|
* 0;255;3;0;9;SHA256: 86DEAE1DAF50D577A4E2262B33ABF9DEE05DD8FAF84F94F50900000000000000
|
|
* 0;255;3;0;9;Skipping security for command 3 type 17
|
|
* 0;255;3;0;9;send: 0-0-3-3 s=255,c=3,t=17,pt=6,l=25,sg=0,st=fail:86DEAE1DAF50D577A4E2262B33ABF9DEE05DD8FAF84F94F509
|
|
* 0;255;3;0;9;Failed to transmit nonce!
|
|
* 0;255;3;0;9;Message is not signed, but it should have been!
|
|
* 0;255;3;0;9;verify fail
|
|
* @endcode
|
|
*
|
|
* The reason for this is that when signing is used, the messages transmitted become relatively large.<br>
|
|
* Because of this, the message is more sensitive to noise, and the chance for a message to get scrambled
|
|
* increase with the message size. Please refer to the troubleshooting section at the MySensors forum for
|
|
* information on how to improve radio performence.<br>
|
|
* This is a good place to start: https://forum.mysensors.org/topic/666/debug-faq-and-how-ask-for-help
|
|
*
|
|
* @subsection MySigningTroubleshootingSymptomNonce Failed to generate nonce
|
|
*
|
|
* The signing backend failed to generate the nonce needed to sign a message. This indicate a hardware
|
|
* problem. Please post the debug info on the forum together with a description of your hardware setup.
|
|
*
|
|
* @subsection MySigningTroubleshootingSymptomSign Failed to sign message
|
|
*
|
|
* The signing backend failed to sign the message. Typically this happens if your message is so large,
|
|
* that there is no room left in the buffer to store a signature.
|
|
*
|
|
* @subsection MySigningTroubleshootingSymptomWrongSource Nonce did not come from the destination (XX) of the message to be signed! It came from YY
|
|
*
|
|
* This should not really happen. The reason for this message is that the signing backend is only capable
|
|
* of handling one signed message session at any time. If for some reason multiple nodes send a nonce message to
|
|
* the same node, only the nonce from a node that is the destination of the current message signing session will be
|
|
* accepted. Any other nonces will be dropped. This should not happen as no node should send a nonce unless asked to,
|
|
* and a node will only ask for a nonce to one destination for every signing session.<br>
|
|
* If you see this message, please post the debugging details on the MySensors forum so it can be investigated further
|
|
* together with a description of your setup.
|
|
*
|
|
* @subsection MySigningTroubleshootingSymptomNotSigned Message is not signed, but it should have been
|
|
*
|
|
* A node has failed to comply with the signing preferences of this node. Check that the node has received a
|
|
* signing presentation message from this node. This is automatically transmitted to gateways. For other nodes,
|
|
* you need to transmit the presentation from the sketch. @see signerPresentation
|
|
*
|
|
* @subsection MySigningTroubleshootingSymptomNotSignedGeneral "Messages do not appear to be signed but I think they should be..."
|
|
*
|
|
* Make sure you have enabled the flag to require signatures to require signatures and have enabled one of the signing
|
|
* backends. @see MY_SIGNING_REQUEST_SIGNATURES @see MY_SIGNING_ATSHA204 @see MY_SIGNING_SOFT
|
|
*
|
|
* @subsection MySigningTroubleshootingSymptomNotWorkingWhitelisting Signature verification failed!
|
|
*
|
|
* Make sure both source and destination of the signed message has undergone @ref personalization with the same HMAC key.<br>
|
|
* Also, if whitelisting is used, make sure the proper serial is paired with the proper node ID at the destination.
|
|
* Whitelisting preferences are communicated with the signing presentation (done automatically from nodes to gateway but
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* has to be explicitly done by sketch for node to node communication). @see signerPresentation
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*/
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/** @}*/
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